

CIGS Special Seminar

Sea Power, Sino-Japanese Security Relations, and the Geopolitics of Continental and Maritime Nations

Speaker: Alessio Patalano

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Introduction

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China's nine-dotted line/Nánhǎi Jiǔduànxiàn/南海九段线 or the "cow's tongue" line/Zhōngguó Niúshéxiàn/中国牛舌线
<http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/72028/76059/78907/8872217.htm>

Dr. Patalano’s Talk: Today’s Topics

The sea is a factor of growing significance in Sino-Japanese security relations. Structurally, the People’s Republic of China (PRC, hereafter China) and Japan are connected to each other through the East China Sea (ECS). Functionally, over the past two decades, the waters of East Asia have come to play a primary role in their respective national security agendas. The main sea routes passing through the ECS offer vital arteries for Chinese and Japanese trade. Fish stocks and natural resources in this basin are invaluable to food and energy requirements of both nations. The ECS constitutes also a main staging platform for the deployment of capabilities to defend national territories as well as for the projection of power (soft and hard) and influence in the region and beyond.

How do Chinese and Japanese strategists view the evolving role of the ECS in security calculations and how is this affecting bilateral security relations? Is the maritime nature of the theatre going to affect the ways in which China and Japan engage with each other, and if so, how? This seminar engages with the above questions investigating how, over the past two decades the strategic meaning of the sea evolved in both countries and how this in turn affects and is likely to affect bilateral security relations.

Program

1. Welcome Remarks Michio Suzuki, Secretary-General, CIGS

2. Wanted: Japan’s Adroit Strategy amidst Sino-American Rivalry

Jun Kurihara, Research Director, CIGS

“In estimating danger there should be a certain sobriety of imagination, equally removed from undue confidence and from exaggerated fears.”

Alfred Thayer Mahan

“Exchange information.” . . . This is of great importance in achieving a common language. (“互通情报”。 . . . 这对于取得共同的语言是很重要的。)

Mao Zedong/毛泽东

3. Sea Power, Sino-Japanese Relations, and the Geopolitics of Continental and Maritime Nations

Alessio Patalano, King’s College London

4. Q&A Moderator: Jun Kurihara

Problematic Peace? Chinese Naval Exercises Conducted in the Western Pacific in 2011



Chinese Authorities

**PLA Navy (PLAN)/
Zhōngguó Hǎijūn/中国海军**

Fleet HQ: Qīngdǎo: Běihǎi Jiànduì/the North Sea Fleet
Fleet HQ: Níngbō: Dōnghǎi Jiànduì/the East Sea Fleet
Fleet HQ: Zhànjiāng: Nánhǎi Jiànduì/the South Sea Fleet

**China Coast Guard/
Hǎijǐng/海警 (M. of Public Security)**

**China Marine Surveillance/
Hǎijiàn/海监 (State Oceanic Adm.)**

**Maritime Safety Administration/
Hǎishì/海事 (M. of Transport)**

**Fisheries Law Enforcement Cmd./
Yúzhèng/鱼政 (M. of AG.)**


**Customs Anti-smuggling Bureau/
Hǎiguān Jísījú/海关缉私局
(General Adm. of Customs)**

Note: The "island chains" concept has never been defined by the PLAN or the Chinese government. The dimensions of "island chains" outlined here are derived from U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), p. 23.

Sources: Data from Japan's Joint Staff Office of the Ministry of Defense and U.S. DoD, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011*, p. 23.

National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), "China Security Report," 2012, p. 11.

Unsettled Peace? Claimed Borders in the South China Sea



"A stable global order ultimately depends on America's ability to renew itself and to act wisely as the promoter and guarantor of a revitalized West and as the balancer and conciliator of a rising East." Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision*, New York: Basic Books, 2012, p. 192.

National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), "China Security Report," 2012, p. 19.

Source: Compiled from U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), p.16, as well as other reports.

Pervasive Historical Analogies

“China Territorial Disputes: A Warning in the History of Imperial Japan,”
Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 5, 2012.

by **Joseph A. BOSCO** (previously worked at the office of the secretary of defense (OSD)) and
Wallace C. “Chip” Gregson (Lt. General (Ret.), former Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific)

“Applying World War II terminology to China’s current behavior may seem overblown, but it is apt. In fact, China’s actions also resemble those of another bad actor of that tragic period: Imperial Japan.”; cf. “美媒称中国在南海行为太像2战日本 应加以挫败” «环球网» [*Global Times*], Sept. 6, 2012. “美国《基督教科学箴言报》9月5日刊登的学者文章甚至将中国比作‘帝国主义时期的日本’，并鼓动以西方为首的西方国家应团结一致，挫败中国的‘冒险主义。’”

“What Roosevelt Would Do in the South China Sea,”
Financial Times, Sept. 4, 2012.

by **James Clad** (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs) and
Robert Manning (former Senior Strategist, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) National Counterproliferation Center)

“Planting flags on islets, declaring cities where there are too few residents to fill a restaurant, and huffing and puffing over uninhabited rocks are acts more suited to a Gilbert and Sullivan farce than to nations in the 21st century. Absurdities aside, the tensions in the South China Sea could shape the balance of power in Asia and put at risk The current surge of interest in the South China Sea is driven first, by China’s steady rise and second, by the perception (if not the reality) of oil and gas deposits that may be accessible using new technologies. . . . A creative diplomacy for the South China Sea needs, for starters, to rein in rivalry.”


Wisdom Needed to Avoid A Vicious Spiral of Pre-WWI Anglo-German Rivalry

Timeline toward Pre-WWI Belligerent World

- 1890: End of Bismarckian Germany; Beginning of the Wilhelmine Era**
Alfred Thayer Mahan: *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*
- 1896: First Lord of the Admiralty Goschen: the “Splendid Isolation” Speech**
- 1897: Anglophobic Alfred von Tirpitz appointed head of the German Imperial Naval Office**
Alfred Thayer Mahan: *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*
- 1898: Das erste Flottengesetz (First German Naval Law)**
- 1900: Das zweite Flottengesetz (Second German Naval Law)**
- 1901: Kaiser Wilhelm II: the “*Ein Platz an der Sonne* (A Place in the Sun)” Speech**
- 1902: Anglo-Japanese Alliance against Russia**
- 1904: Anglo-Franco Entente Cordiale against Wilhelmine Germany**
Anti-German British Admiral John “Jacky” Fisher appointed First Sea Lord
- 1904~1905: Russo-Japanese War**
- 1905~1906: the First Moroccan Crisis**
- 1907: the Crowe Memorandum, warning against the rise of Germany**
Germany accounts for half of world exports of electrical equipment
Anglo-Franco-Russian Triple Entente against the 1882 Triple Alliance
- 1911: the Agadir Crisis, or the Second Moroccan Crisis**
- 1912: First Lord of Admiralty Churchill: the Speech calling the German Navy a “luxury”**
- 1914: A German general becomes a military commander for the Ottoman Empire**
Outbreak of WWI

Land or Sea Energy Security?:

China's Import Transit Routes and Proposed Routes for Bypassing SLOCs



Source: U.S. Dept of Defense (DoD), "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2012," 2012, p. 41.

*Can Economic Interdependence Be Helpful?:
An Illuminating Historical Case: Anglo-German Rivalry*

**“日本对华投资逆势增长/Japan’s Growing Investment in China”
«新华网» [Xinhua], Sept. 7, 2012.**

“Industry itself was divided: between 1904 and 1914 Britain was Germany’s best overseas customer, and Germany was Britain’s second best; twenty-two out of forty international producer cartels were Anglo-German organizations.”

*(Hew Strachan, *The First World War, Volume I: To Arms*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 23; see also, Zara Steiner, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1977, pp. 60-64.)*

“Economic interdependence is not always a cause of friendship and can, at times, become a major source of insecurity and friction.”

*(Aaron L. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2011, p. 47; see also, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw-Hil, 1979, pp. 129-160.)*

Toward A More Peaceful Asia: A Small Step, If Not A Giant Leap

Developing “Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)”

Avoid Misperceptions and Miscalculations by Developing a Common Language

“It was *people* who actually *precipitated* wars.”

John Stoessinger (in his *Why Nations Go to War*, quoted in *China, the United States, and 21st Century Sea Power*, edited by Andrew S. Erickson *et al.*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010, p. 41).

Maintain and Expand the 35-year-old Council on Political and Economic Affairs of China [中国政經懇談会/中政懇]; cf. “Japan-China Military Confidence Building Measures,” by Toshimichi Nagaiwa and Jun Kurihara, *Tokyo-Cambridge Gazette: Politico-Economic Commentaries* No. 7, CIGS, October 11, 2011.


Prevention of Incident at Sea (and Unbridled Nationalism)

An INCSEA-like agreement: the prototype: the U.S.-Soviet 1972 agreement; cf. “The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation: Lessons from 1995-1999” by Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, *Washington Quarterly* Vol. 29, No.1, 2005.

Promotion of Military-to-Military Cooperation in Non-traditional Areas

Development of Non-traditional Activities incl. MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War); cf. “中国军方成立非战争军事行动研究中心” «中国新闻网» [*China News*] Dec. 12, 2011.

Dr. Alessio Patalano’s Latest Book: *Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain: From the First Alliance to Post 9/11* (published in 2012).



Edited by Alessio Patalano, King's College, London

Sharing a similar geography at the opposite ends of the Eurasian Continent and dependent on maritime trade to supplement the lack of strategic resources, both the UK and Japan relied on the sea for their economic survival and independence as sovereign states. From the first alliance in 1902, through the World Wars, to the more recent operations in the Indian Ocean and Iraq, sea power has played a central role in the strategic calculus of both countries. This thought-provoking book, comprising contributions from a group of international scholars, explores the strategic meaning of being an island nation. It investigates how, across more than a century, sea power empowered - and continues to empower - both the UK and Japan with a defensive shield, an instrument of deterrence, and an enabling tool in expeditionary missions to implement courses of action to preserve national economic and security interests worldwide.

Positioned within the comparative literature on Japan and the UK, the volume will have wide-ranging appeal including studies in Anglo-Japanese Relations, Naval Military History, and Studies in East Asian Defence and Security, including Anglo-American and US-Japan strategic interests

(<http://www.brill.com/maritime-strategy-and-national-security-japan-and-britain>)