CIGS Special Seminar


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Introduction
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China’s nine-dotted line/Nánhải Jiǔduànxiàn/南海九段线 or the “cow’s tongue” line/Zhōngguó Niúshéxiàn/中国牛舌线
The sea is a factor of growing significance in Sino-Japanese security relations. Structurally, the People's Republic of China (PRC, hereafter China) and Japan are connected to each other through the East China Sea (ECS). Functionally, over the past two decades, the waters of East Asia have come to play a primary role in their respective national security agendas. The main sea routes passing through the ECS offer vital arteries for Chinese and Japanese trade. Fish stocks and natural resources in this basin are invaluable to food and energy requirements of both nations. The ECS constitutes also a main staging platform for the deployment of capabilities to defend national territories as well as for the projection of power (soft and hard) and influence in the region and beyond.

How do Chinese and Japanese strategists view the evolving role of the ECS in security calculations and how is this affecting bilateral security relations? Is the maritime nature of the theatre going to affect the ways in which China and Japan engage with each other, and if so, how? This seminar engages with the above questions investigating how, over the past two decades the strategic meaning of the sea evolved in both countries and how this in turn affects and is likely to affect bilateral security relations.
Program

1. Welcome Remarks  Michio Suzuki, Secretary-General, CIGS

2. Wanted: Japan’s Adroit Strategy amidst Sino-American Rivalry
   Jun Kurihara, Research Director, CIGS

   “In estimating danger there should be a certain sobriety of imagination, equally removed from undue confidence and from exaggerated fears.”
   Alfred Thayer Mahan

   “Exchange information.” . . . This is of great importance in achieving a common language. ("互通情报"。… 这对于取得共同的语言是很重要的。)
   Mao Zedong/毛泽东

   Alessio Patalano, King’s College London

4. Q&A  Moderator: Jun Kurihara
Problematic Peace? Chinese Naval Exercises Conducted in the Western Pacific in 2011

Chinese Authorities
PLA Navy (PLAN)/Zhōngguó Hǎijūn/中国海军
Fleet HQ: Qīngdǎo: Běihǎi Jiànduì/the North Sea Fleet
Fleet HQ: Níngbō: Dōnghǎi Jiànduì/the East Sea Fleet
Fleet HQ: Zhànjiāng: Nánhǎi Jiànduì/the South Sea Fleet

China Coast Guard/Hǎijǐng/海警 (M. of Public Security)

China Marine Surveillance/Hǎijiàn/海监 (State Oceanic Adm.)

Maritime Safety Administration/Hǎishì/海事 (M. of Transport)

Fisheries Law Enforcement Cmd./Yúzhèng/鱼政 (M. of AG.)

Customs Anti-smuggling Bureau/Hǎiguān Jísījú/海关辑私局 (General Adm. of Customs)

Note: The “island chains” concept has never been defined by the PLAN or the Chinese government. The dimensions of “island chains” outlined here are derived from U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), p. 23.

Unsettled Peace? Claimed Borders in the South China Sea


Applying World War II terminology to China’s current behavior may seem overblown, but it is apt. In fact, China’s actions also resemble those of another bad actor of that tragic period: Imperial Japan."

"What Roosevelt Would Do in the South China Sea,"


“Planting flags on islets, declaring cities where there are too few residents to fill a restaurant, and huffing and puffing over uninhabited rocks are acts more suited to a Gilbert and Sullivan farce than to nations in the 21st century. Absurdities aside, the tensions in the South China Sea could shape the balance of power in Asia and put at risk . . . . The current surge of interest in the South China Sea is driven first, by China’s steady rise and second, by the perception (if not the reality) of oil and gas deposits that may be accessible using new technologies . . . . A creative diplomacy for the South China Sea needs, for starters, to rein in rivalry.”
Wisdom Needed to Avoid A Vicious Spiral of Pre-WWI Anglo-German Rivalry . . . .

Timeline toward Pre-WWI Belligerent World

1890: End of Bismarckian Germany; Beginning of the Wilhelmine Era
   Alfred Thayer Mahan: *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*

1896: First Lord of the Admiralty Goschen: the “Splendid Isolation” Speech

1897: Anglophobic Alfred von Tirpitz appointed head of the German Imperial Naval Office
   Alfred Thayer Mahan: *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future*

1898: *Das erste Flottengesetz* (First German Naval Law)

1900: *Das zweite Flottengesetz* (Second German Naval Law)

1901: Kaiser Wilhelm II: the “*Ein Platz an der Sonne* (A Place in the Sun)” Speech

1902: Anglo-Japanese Alliance against Russia

1904: Anglo-Franco Entente Cordiale against Wilhelmine Germany
   Anti-German British Admiral John “Jacky” Fisher appointed First Sea Lord

1904~1905: Russo-Japanese War

1905~1906: the First Moroccan Crisis

1907: the Crowe Memorandum, warning against the rise of Germany
   Germany accounts for half of world exports of electrical equipment
   Anglo-Franco-Russian Triple Entente against the 1882 Triple Alliance

1911: the Agadir Crisis, or the Second Moroccan Crisis

1912: First Lord of Admiralty Churchill: the Speech calling the German Navy a “luxury”

1914: A German general becomes a military commander for the Ottoman Empire

Outbreak of WWI
Land or Sea Energy Security?:
China’s Import Transit Routes and Proposed Routes for Bypassing SLOCs

“Industry itself was divided: between 1904 and 1914 Britain was Germany’s best overseas customer, and Germany was Britain’s second best; twenty-two out of forty international producer cartels were Anglo-German organizations.”


“Economic interdependence is not always a cause of friendship and can, at times, becomes a major source of insecurity and friction.”

Avoid Misperceptions and Miscalculations by Developing a Common Language

“It was people who actually precipitated wars.”


Prevention of Incident at Sea (and Unbridled Nationalism)


Promotion of Military-to-Military Cooperation in Non-traditional Areas

Sharing a similar geography at the opposite ends of the Eurasian Continent and dependent on maritime trade to supplement the lack of strategic resources, both the UK and Japan relied on the sea for their economic survival and independence as sovereign states. From the first alliance in 1902, through the World Wars, to the more recent operations in the Indian Ocean and Iraq, sea power has played a central role in the strategic calculus of both countries. This thought-provoking book, comprising contributions from a group of international scholars, explores the strategic meaning of being an island nation. It investigates how, across more than a century, sea power empowered - and continues to empower - both the UK and Japan with a defensive shield, an instrument of deterrence, and an enabling tool in expeditionary missions to implement courses of action to preserve national economic and security interests worldwide.